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norTh ameriCa
For The poor, bail oFTen meanS jail
A Human Rights Watch study found 
that 87 percent of people arrested in New 
York City in 2008 on non-felony charges 
were unable to post bail set for $1,000 
or less. Nearly three-quarters of these 
prisoners were accused of nonviolent, non-
weapons related crimes such as shoplift-
ing. Former Supreme Court Justice Arthur 
Goldberg explained that, “After arrest, the 
accused who is poor must often await the 
disposition of his case in jail because of 
his inability to raise bail, while the accused 
who can afford bail is free to return to his 
family and job … This is an example of 
justice denied, of a man imprisoned for no 
reason other than his poverty …”
Bail requirements are an incentive for 
defendants to attend court proceedings by 
threatening monetary loss if they fail to 
appear in court. Judges have broad discre-
tion to set the amount of bail so long as the 
amount set is within the constitutional con-
fines of the Eighth Amendment prohibi-
tion against excessive bail. The amount of 
bail should be no more than is reasonably 
needed to keep the suspect from fleeing 
before or during the case. Unable to make 
bail, indigent defendants must often spend 
time in jail awaiting trial. In addition to the 
stressful and often violent experience of 
imprisonment, pretrial detention can cause 
defendants to lose jobs and income, keep 
defendants from caring for children or sick 
relatives, and prevent school attendance.
This system of monetary bail require-
ments unfairly denies indigent defendants 
their right to liberty and therefore con-
travenes both the U.S. Constitution and 
persuasive international customary law. 
For instance, Article 9 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights prohibits 
arbitrary detention and Article 9(1) of 
the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), which the U.S. 
ratified in 1992, states that, “everyone has 
the right to liberty and security of person.” 
In addition, ICCPR Article 2(1) requires 
the protection of the rights outlined in the 
Convention, including the right to liberty, 
“without distinction of any kind,” and spe-
cifically identifies “property” as a prohib-
ited basis for discrimination. The UDHR 
and the ICCPR are not enforceable on the 
U.S. The absence of enforceable interna-
tional obligations imposed on the U.S. may 
be one of the reasons why this system of 
monetary bail requirements has not been 
amended and continues to unfairly deny 
indigent defendants their right to liberty.
Defendants who are unable to post bail 
are punished through extended imprison-
ment prior to any guilty verdict. Also, the 
threat of confinement or continued con-
finement often causes defendants charged 
with misdemeanors to plead guilty because 
many misdemeanors do not carry a prison 
sentence, and defendants can often plea 
bargain for a lesser punishment. Some 
U.S. cities have implemented reform mea-
sures that have significantly reduced the 
number of pre-trial detentions. In 1982, 
Philadelphia decreased the number of peo-
ple detained for failure to post bail by 26 
percent by implementing new bail guide-
lines based on empirical data. Bail guide-
lines are similar to sentencing guidelines in 
that they delineate what arraignment deci-
sions are most appropriate for individual 
defendants. Unfortunately, these guide-
lines became outdated and many judges 
have chosen to ignore them. However, 
Philadelphia and other cities can use up-to-
date empirical data to better predict which 
defendants pose the highest risk of miss-
ing their court appearances, and in turn, 
only require monetary bail from high risk 
defendants.
Allegheny County, in southwestern 
Pennsylvania, expanded on the Philadelphia 
model by creating a pretrial services 
agency that obtains detailed information 
about defendants and assesses their threat 
to the community and their risk of missing 
court appearances. The pretrial services 
agency also uses many non-monetary bond 
options, including a call-in and in-person 
reporting system, drug testing, and elec-
tronic monitoring. Washington, DC also 
uses a pretrial services agency and tries 
to minimize pretrial detention for indigent 
defendants because, “non-financial condi-
tional release . . . is more effective.”
Other U.S. cities can use these mod-
els to decrease the number of indigent 
defendants who are detained for failure to 
post bail. Although current bail policies in 
many U.S. jurisdictions are discriminatory 
and violate the U.S. Constitution’s prohibi-
tion on excessive bail fees, these jurisdic-
tions can adopt policies used in places such 
as Allegheny County and Washington, DC 
to significantly improve this situation.
obama WaiveS SanCTionS For Four 
CounTrieS ThaT uSe Child SoldierS
For the past year, American taxes funded 
military assistance to four governments 
who use child-soldiers. On October 25, 
2010, President Obama issued a waiver of 
penalties under section 404(a) of the Child 
Soldier Prevention and Accountability Act 
(CSPAA) of 2008 for Chad, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC), Yemen and 
the Sudan. The waiver allows these coun-
tries to continue to receive military aid 
from the U.S. despite their widespread use 
of child soldiers. President Obama deter-
mined that these countries are of particular 
importance for national security and that 
it was a national interest to waive sanc-
tions. These countries currently receive 
U.S. military aid for special operations and 
counterterrorism missions, humanitarian 
efforts in Chad for Darfuri refugees, and 
assisting Yemen in rebuilding its military 
capacity. However, many human rights 
activists argue that the waiver signals that 
counter-terrorism work takes precedence 
over human rights concerns.
In 2008, the United States passed the 
CSPAA, in order to encourage compli-
ance with the Optional Protocol to the 
UN Convention on Rights of the Child 
on the Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict (Optional Protocol). The CSPAA 
is part of the larger human trafficking 
bill, the William Wilberforce Trafficking 
Victims Protection Reauthorization Act 
of 2008 (WWTVPRA). The act prohibits 
funding for countries known to recruit or 
use child soldiers; however, it permits a 
national interest waiver of the ban. Under 
the CSPAA, governments whose military 
forces recruit or use children in violation 
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of existing international standards will be 
given two years to release the children 
within their ranks. During this period, 
the U.S. will only provide military aid to 
specifically support that process. If child 
soldiers are still being used or recruited 
after the two year period ends, all forms of 
U.S. military assistance will be suspended.
 The recruitment of child soldiers is a 
routine practice in Chad, the DRC, Yemen 
and the Sudan. In 2009, the government of 
Chad conscripted refugee children to use 
as combatants and guards in its clashes 
with rebel forces. Children were forced 
to carry heavy ammunition and supplies 
through difficult terrain in the DRC and 
hundreds of boys and girls were forced into 
the southern Sudanese army, despite a com-
mitment by the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Army to release them. In Yemen, children 
are thought to comprise half the ranks of 
both the government forces and the oppos-
ing rebels.
State Department officials say that 
these countries are working to eliminate 
the use of child soldiers, but have had dif-
ficulty implementing policies to end the 
practice. The Obama administration claims 
that engaging these militaries is the most 
effective way to encourage the reforms that 
would end the use of child soldiers. The 
State Department further argues that end-
ing military aid could negatively impact 
valuable military force modernization and 
human rights training.
Human rights groups are skeptical of 
the administration’s approach. Jo Becker, 
advocacy director for the children’s rights 
division at Human Rights Watch, noted 
that the blanket waiver of penalties indi-
cates that the U.S. is giving up all of its 
leverage to force these countries to stop 
using child soldiers. This is especially sig-
nificant given that the WWTVPRA already 
contains exemptions that allow continued 
U.S. funding for programs that directly 
target the problem of child soldiers or 
aid in the professionalization of armies. 
Therefore, the Obama administration did 
not need to waive the penalties under the 
CSPAA to continue to work toward force 
modernization and human rights reforms 
in these countries.
Critics of the waiver argue that the 
U.S. should use its influence to persuade 
countries to end their use of child soldiers 
through cooperation with international 
organizations and international legal agree-
ments. All four of the countries in question 
have ratified the UN Convention on Rights 
of the Child and the Optional Protocol to 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on the Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict. In addition, Chad has ratified the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare 
of the Child (African Charter), and both 
Chad and the DRC have ratified the Rome 
Statute, which establishes the International 
Criminal Court and renders the use of child 
soldiers a prosecutable war crime. Both 
collectively and separately, these inter-
national agreements bar the recruitment 
and use of children as soldiers in armed 
conflict. Thus, Chad, Yemen, Sudan, and 
the DRC are non-compliant with their 
international obligations.
The UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child and the African Charter have 
committees that monitor compliance, but 
they are limited to collecting and reporting 
information on compliance. Nevertheless, 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) has 
been prosecuting individuals on charges 
of recruitment and use of child soldiers, 
and has investigated possible war crimes 
involving the use of child soldiers by the 
Sudan and the DRC since 2005. Additional 
charges and convictions stemming from 
the use of child soldiers have been pur-
sued with the 2002 implementation of the 
Optional Protocol.
By waiving the penalties associated 
with using child soldiers, the U.S. is fail-
ing to meet its own obligations and failing 
to encourage other States to comply with 
the international laws protecting children. 
Instead the U.S. is focusing on maintaining 
strategic alliances. This posture under-
mines efforts to end the conscription of 
children into military forces around the 
world.
Aimee Mayer, a J.D. candidate at the American 
University Washington College of Law, covers 
North America for the Human Rights Brief.
laTin ameriCa
violenCe againST irregular 
migranTS in mexiCo
The human rights of migrants in 
Mexico have drastically deteriorated in 
recent years. Gang-related violence has 
made Mexico particularly dangerous for 
irregular migrants traveling to the United 
States. Along their journey, these migrants, 
mostly from Central America, are com-
monly subject to extortion, kidnapping, 
rape, torture, and other abuses with little 
chance of redress because they have not 
entered through legal channels and could 
be subject to imprisonment or deporta-
tion themselves. Moreover, the situation 
encourages recidivism of violence, because 
migrant victims are not able to aid in pros-
ecuting the abuses.
Recently, the UN High Commissioner 
on Human Rights called for an investiga-
tion into the alleged abduction of forty 
migrants traveling on a state-run train. The 
abduction occurred after the train driver 
allegedly extorted money from the pas-
sengers. The driver then allegedly stopped 
the train to allow unidentified gunmen 
aboard who robbed and abducted some of 
the passengers. The events seemed to occur 
despite an earlier search of the train by the 
Federal Police and the National Institute of 
Migration staff.
The irregular status of the migrants 
impedes the reporting of abuses because 
Article 67 of Mexico’s Population Law 
requires authorities to obtain proof of the 
reporter’s legal presence in the country 
before investigating any grievances. If a 
victim of abuse is unable to prove his legal 
right to be in the country, he is taken to 
the migration authority. This process can 
lead to voluntary repatriation or deporta-
tion that prevents the victim from assist-
ing in the investigation or prosecution of 
suspects. In Mexico, this kind of impunity 
results in unchecked violence against irreg-
ular migrants by nationals. The Mexican 
Government has created a temporary visa 
for migrants who are victims of crime, but 
it has proven extremely difficult for most 
victims to obtain.
Without providing better access to the 
temporary visa, Article 67 of the Population 
Law violates Mexico’s international human 
rights obligations to provide equal access 
to the courts to all people in its territory by 
prioritizing migration status over criminal 
justice. The International Convention on 
Migrant Workers, to which Mexico is a 
party, confers the right to security of person 
and effective protection by the state against 
violence to migrants without discrimina-
tion against alien status. Moreover, in 2003 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
ruled that states have an obligation to act 
with due diligence to prevent and punish 
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abuses against migrants by state officials 
and private individuals.
Migrants typically journey across 
Mexico on foot or by secretly riding on 
freight trains. Along the well-traveled 
routes, gangs routinely prey on travelers 
and are believed to be aided by govern-
ment authorities in their extortion attempts. 
Of the 238 migrant victims interviewed 
by Mexico’s National Human Rights 
Commission, 91 interviewees stated that 
public officials were directly responsible 
for their kidnapping and a further 99 
victims observed police colluding with 
kidnappers during their captivity. If kid-
napped, migrants are sometimes tortured 
until they reveal the phone numbers of 
family members living in the United 
States, and then they are held for ransom. 
If ransom is not paid, they are sometimes 
murdered. According to some sources, as 
many as six of every ten female migrants, 
many under the age of eighteen, are raped 
on the journey.
In accordance with Central American 
governments’ attempts to repatriate irregu-
lar migrants with dignity and to combat 
overcrowding in detention centers, Mexico 
permits migrants identified by authorities 
to opt for a voluntary repatriation instead 
of the traditional administrative immigra-
tion process. If a migrant chooses repatria-
tion, he is sent back to his country almost 
immediately and is not registered. Not 
registering the migrants has several ben-
efits such as saving Mexico’s resources and 
allowing the migrants to avoid criminaliza-
tion. However, it is not a panacea because it 
also leads to further attempts at migration 
across Mexico, leaving migrants vulner-
able once again for the duration of a second 
trip. If the migrant chooses the traditional 
process, he is kept in a detention center and 
is often deported after proceedings.
Mexico began allowing migrants who 
were victims or witnesses of a crime to 
apply for a temporary visa pending resolu-
tion of the criminal proceedings in 2007. 
The process has been largely ineffective; 
generally only those who are accompanied 
and sponsored by an NGO or priest obtain 
a visa. Since the temporary visa option was 
established, only ten to fourteen people 
each year have obtained one.
The Mexican government has been an 
outspoken advocate of irregular migrants’ 
rights internationally, and the creation of 
the temporary visa in 2007 was an attempt 
to address the dangers faced by irregu-
lar migrants. Nonetheless, these measures 
have been largely ineffective. The lack of 
due process protections under Article 67 of 
the Population Law for victims, the cycli-
cal violence from unregistered repatria-
tions, and the extreme hurdles in obtaining 
a temporary visa all stand in the way of 
Mexico meeting its international human 
rights obligations. A concerted action 
among elements of the nation’s criminal, 
judicial, and immigration policies are nec-
essary to prevent and prosecute the crimes 
committed against irregular migrants in 
Mexico.
“baby doC” Charged WiTh CrimeS 
againST humaniTy
After twenty-five years in self-imposed 
exile, Haiti’s ex-dictator Jean-Claude 
“Baby Doc” Duvalier has returned to Haiti 
and been charged with crimes against 
humanity for events that occurred during 
his 1971-1986 dictatorship. Duvalier’s dic-
tatorship was known for carrying out tor-
ture, execution, and forced disappearances 
through the National Security Volunteers 
militia, known as the tonton macoutes.
The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) criminalizes 
crimes against humanity, among other 
acts, but cannot be applied retroactively. 
Furthermore, international criminal pros-
ecution can be very difficult, as would 
be organizing a trial in Haiti. However, 
the Haitian people may find redress in a 
new Swiss law that would return to Haiti 
the contents of Duvalier’s frozen Swiss 
accounts.
After Duvalier’s return to Haiti on 
January 16, 2011, he was charged by a 
prosecutor for corruption and embezzle-
ment. In the following days, four Haitians, 
including a former UN spokeswoman, 
filed separate charges of torture and crimes 
against humanity under Haitian law. A 
group of agricultural laborers who allege 
Duvalier sold them into slavery in the 
Dominican Republic also filed a law-
suit alleging Duvalier’s responsibility for 
crimes against humanity. Duvalier has not 
yet issued a response to the allegations. 
Unfortunately, without the creation of a 
special tribunal specifically authorized to 
address this issue, no international criminal 
charges can be brought against Duvalier. 
The ICC does not have jurisdiction over 
his case because the crime occurred prior 
to the entry into force of the Rome Statute 
on July 1, 2002. The charges also can-
not be brought before the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights because the Court 
only has jurisdiction to hear cases brought 
against a state – not an individual, even 
former heads of state.
Although Duvalier might not be tried 
in an international court for the crimes 
he allegedly committed, victims may still 
be able to seek monetary reparations. 
Duvalier currently has about $6 million in 
frozen assets in a Swiss account. In recent 
years, Switzerland began returning “poten-
tate funds” from ousted dictators’ accounts 
to their respective nations.
On February 1, 2011, new legislation in 
Switzerland, dubbed the “Duvalier Act” by 
the Swiss press, took effect and provided 
for the return of $6 million of Duvalier’s 
funds to Haiti, “to be used to improve 
the lives of all the Haitian people.” The 
new legislation shifts the burden to the 
fund-holder to prove he or she acquired 
the funds legally, as opposed to the state 
having a burden to prove the funds were 
acquired illegally.
If tried, Duvalier will be the first for-
mer head of state tried in a Haitian court. 
The United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights has already offered 
technical assistance to the Haitian judi-
ciary specifically for the Duvalier case. 
Other Latin American states, such as Peru, 
Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, have suc-
cessfully tried former heads of state with-
out international assistance or international 
tribunals. However, Haiti will likely need 
more assistance than those states because 
of the lack of infrastructure, rampant cor-
ruption, and deficiency of expertise to try 
such a complex and controversial case. Not 
only will the state judiciary require techni-
cal assistance in establishing a national 
tribunal, but also the victims will need help 
presenting their cases.
The UN High Commissioner has called 
on the Haitian authorities, “to send a mes-
sage to the world that their national courts 
can ensure accountability for serious vio-
lations of human rights, even in difficult 
humanitarian and political contexts.” Even 
if prosecution of Duvalier fails, Haiti will 
still likely see the return of the $6 million 
in frozen funds. If these greatly needed 
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funds do make their way back to Haiti, 
their use for victims reparations would be a 
step towards victims’ justice in Haiti.
Jessica Lynd, a J.D. candidate at the American 
University Washington College of Law, covers 
Latin America for the Human Rights Brief.
middle eaST and norTh aFriCa
Coping WiTh The reFugee 
impliCaTionS and inTernaTional 
obligaTionS aS a reSulT oF The neW 
SouTh Sudan
“Egypt’s top priority in Africa is the 
future of Sudan,” stated a Wikileak cable 
that further explained that a unified Sudan 
would serve Egypt’s interest. According to 
an Egyptian official, the creation of a new 
South Sudanese state would likely increase 
the flow of refugees into Egypt. With 
the combination of an estimated 1.5 mil-
lion new South Sudanese refugees enter-
ing Egypt post-South Sudan, the future 
of Sudan certainly merits its position as 
Egypt’s top priority in Africa. Its inability 
to accommodate its current refugee popu-
lation in accordance with international 
human rights and refugee law is not a posi-
tive indicator for Egypt’s ability to meet its 
international obligations – with the needs 
of an expanded refugee population.
During the second week of January 
2011, South Sudan voted overwhelmingly 
for independence in a referendum. The 
vote resulted in the creation of a new state, 
splitting the religiously and ethnically 
divided Sudan in two. With over one mil-
lion South Sudanese living in north Sudan, 
the referendum could result in a mass exo-
dus of Southern Sudanese from Khartoum 
and it’s outlying areas into neighboring 
Egypt. These new refugees would join 
some 750,000 Sudanese already residing 
in Egypt.
Although the Sudanese refugees that 
currently reside in Egypt fled Sudan seek-
ing safety, they encountered new chal-
lenges of poverty and exploitation in Egypt. 
Egypt utilizes the broad and encompassing 
definition of “refugee” as put forth by the 
Organization of African Unity Convention 
– a definition that is widely heralded as 
a success by the international community 
for its flexibility. Of the 750,000 Sudanese 
in Egypt, only 18,000 are legally regis-
tered with the government. Unregistered 
Sudanese refugees cannot legally work, 
cannot utilize the public education system, 
and have had difficulty seeking legal rem-
edy to bring complaints of mistreatment by 
security forces.
Egypt’s practice of refugee mistreat-
ment extends further than just limiting 
their legal rights. The state has used vio-
lence against Sudanese refugees and has 
illegally deported refugees back to their 
home state, despite their vulnerability to 
torture and detention. There is also evi-
dence that Egyptian soldiers have shot at 
and killed African migrants being deported 
from or trying to enter Israel through the 
Egyptian/Israeli border.
Egypt has no national implementing 
legislation relating to refugees. Its legal 
obligations arise from provisions in inter-
national agreements it is party to, including 
the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 
Protocol as well as the African Refugee 
Convention of 1974. Both conventions 
prohibit the forcible return, or refoulment, 
of refugees to another state where the 
refugee has a reasonable fear of persecu-
tion. Furthermore, killing refugees and 
asylum-seekers is a violation of Article 7 
of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and Article 4 of the African 
Charter on Human and People’s Rights, 
international instruments to which Egypt 
is a party.
With such a poor track record, it is 
difficult to foresee how Egypt will accom-
modate the possible influx of Sudanese 
refugees in the wake of post-referendum 
violence in Sudan. Khartoum’s water con-
cerns and apprehension of South Sudan 
as an upper-riparian state have already 
laid the groundwork for a hostile rela-
tionship with the new state. Regardless, 
Egypt has international obligations to treat 
new South Sudanese refugees humanely, 
either by offering them the potential of 
asylum or ensuring that they are not forc-
ibly deported to Sudan. Even though the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees has 
already begun to create contingency plans 
for displaced South Sudanese, Egypt has to 
prepare for its international obligations that 
are likely to be triggered by the reality of 
an independent South Sudan.
SaharaWi Call For independenCe 
gainS aTTenTion
In a rare moments the world’s atten-
tion was drawn to the protests of Western 
Sahara activists on November 8, 2010. 
After months of peaceful protest, 
Moroccan authorities reportedly attacked 
about 12,000 Saharwis, killing eight and 
wounding 700. The Saharwi, indigenous 
peoples from Western Sahara, were pro-
testing the economic and social exclu-
sion they suffered under Moroccan rule. 
The attack came just a few weeks before 
UN-mediated negotiations were scheduled 
to commence on the territorial status of the 
Western Sahara.
U.S. media has not often focused 
on the plight of the Saharwis, likely in 
part because the U.S. has long supported 
Morocco’s occupation of the Western 
Sahara – the longest territorial conflict in 
Africa. After emerging from the colonial 
control of Spain in 1966, the Western 
Sahara was soon occupied by neighboring 
Morocco. The occupation violated a 1975 
UN Security Council Resolution asserting 
Western Sahara’s right to self-determina-
tion and disregarded an advisory opinion 
by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
in 1975. The ICJ opinion defined the 
Western Sahara as non-self-governing ter-
ritory under belligerent military occupa-
tion. Since then, Morocco has negotiated 
several agreements regarding the territory, 
the most recent being the 1991 Settlement 
Plan (Settlement Plan) between Morocco 
and Polisario Front, the Sahrawi National 
Liberation Movement. The Settlement 
Plan, which the UN Security Council and 
the U.S. endorsed, called for a referendum 
on Saharwi self-determination to be held 
in Western Sahara. To date, no definitive 
plans for such a referendum have emerged, 
largely because of Morocco’s reluctance to 
support steps towards self-determination. 
Meanwhile, Saharwi activists still angrily 
protest against Morocco’s occupation and 
policies within the Western Sahara.
The twenty years since the Settlement 
Plan have witnessed a significant shift in 
the international landscape that may shed 
light on options for the Western Sahara, 
both in regards to internal and external 
self-declaration. International law does not 
contain a right to external self-declaration, 
nor does specifically prohibit it. As articu-
lated by the Canadian Supreme Court 
in Reference re Seccession of Quebec, 
the right to external self-determination 
“arises only in the most extreme cases and, 
even then, under carefully defined cir-
cumstances.” The court further explained 
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that those circumstances would need to 
include an environment where people are 
“prohibited from a meaningful exercise of 
self-declaration” within the state or where 
“a people are subject to alien subjugation, 
domination, or exploitation.”
In 1998, when the Canadian Supreme 
Court decided Reference re Seccession 
of Quebec, few successful examples of 
internal self-declaration existed. Instead, 
the international community repudiated 
numerous declarations of internal self-
declaration, like that of Northern Cyprus. 
In terms of the Western Sahara, the prec-
edent for unilaterally declaring indepen-
dence was sparse. However, in light of 
recent events, the indigenous people of 
Western Sahara may have greater reason 
to hope that the international community 
will give deference to their claims of self-
determination. In particular, the landmark 
advisory opinion of the ICJ in Accordance 
With International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence in Respect 
of Kosovo provides the most encourag-
ing precedent for unilateral declarations 
of self-determination, albeit a vague one. 
The ICJ was careful to make its holding 
extremely narrow by emphasizing the par-
ticularities of Kosovo’s recent history and 
the likely absence of substantial violence 
that would accompany self-determination, 
distinguishing the case of Kosovo from 
those of Northern Cyprus and Southern 
Rhodesia. Yet, although the circumstance 
of the Western Sahara is not identical to 
that of Kosovo, both states share similari-
ties. Like Kosovo, the Western Sahara has 
been the subject of numerous UN resolu-
tions and is presently not threatening vio-
lence. Additionally, in both states, access 
to government mechanisms and justice sys-
tems was limited. Moreover, as in the case 
of Kosovo, the UN and other international 
institutions have given more credence to 
Western Sahara’s claim for autonomy.
Saharwis might not have to unilaterally 
declare independence if Morocco follows 
the example of Sudan. In a highly antici-
pated referendum on self-determination, 
the people of South Sudan popularly and 
peacefully voted for independence on 
January 9, 2011. The positive and peace-
ful model of transition of South Sudan 
could provide Morocco with the impetus 
to revisit the idea of a referendum in the 
Western Sahara. While the case of South 
Sudan is peppered with controversy, the 
international community’s acceptance and 
support for South Sudan’s right to self-
determination sets an encouraging prec-
edent for Western Sahara.
In contrast to 1991, today the Western 
Sahara has more precedent to draw on 
in the event that a referendum is held, or 
autonomy is declared. Although the vio-
lent repression on November 8 delayed 
UN talks on the territorial status of the 
Western Sahara, when the talks do com-
mence, the cases of Kosovo and Sudan 
will importantly highlight possible paths to 
self-determination for the Saharwis.
a break WiTh kemaliSm and a 
more demoCraTiC ConSTiTuTional 
CourT? – The poTenTial 
impliCaTionS oF Turkey’S 
ConSTiTuTional reFerendum
On September 12, 2010, 58 percent 
of Turkish citizens voted in favor of a 
constitutional referendum, introducing 26 
amendments to Turkey’s Constitution. The 
referendum pitted supporters of the old-
est political party in Turkey, the left-wing 
Republican People’s Party (CHP), against 
the fastest growing political party, the con-
servative Justice and Development Party 
(AKP). Among these amendments were 
administrative reforms to the Constitutional 
Court providing for more nuanced appoint-
ment procedures. Despite the criticisms 
directed at the AKP and the monumental 
potential the referendum will have on 
Turkey’s founding principles, there is much 
reason to believe that these administrative 
reforms will result in a more democratic 
Constitutional Court.
Campaigns around the constitutional 
referendum further polarized the already 
fragmented political landscape in Turkey. 
Since the AKP came to power in 2003, 
Turkish politics have been particularly 
divisive. The main difference between 
the AKP and its opponents lies in their 
opposing interpretations of Kemalism – a 
political ideology rooted in laicism, moder-
nity, and republicanism as espoused by 
Turkey’s founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. 
Supporters of the CHP claim that the AKP 
has betrayed Kemalism by adopting politi-
cal positions more conservative than those 
envisioned by Ataturk. The referendum 
ushered in more waves of criticism from 
the CHP, as the party claimed that the con-
stitutional reforms would undermine the 
independence of the judiciary by firmly 
bringing the Constitutional Court under the 
control of the AKP.
In spite of these critiques, the results of 
the referendum will change several discreet 
administrative matters that could facilitate 
the establishment of a more independent 
and democratic judiciary. Two of the most 
pivotal reforms are directed towards the 
appointment procedures and term limits of 
Constitutional Court justices. The amend-
ment to Article 146 of the former constitu-
tion, outlining appointment procedures of 
the Constitutional Court justices, is one of 
these changes. Under the old constitution, 
the President appointed justices from a list 
of nominees derived by the plenary assem-
blies of various courts. Plenary assemblies, 
which are used in countries like France and 
Spain, are composed of political appoin-
tees that are subject to political influences. 
In Turkey, plenary assemblies are often 
politically appointed and composed of tra-
ditionally Kemalist judges, who nomi-
nate justices with similar Kemalist back-
grounds.
In contrast, the new constitution calls 
for a representative system where the 
President and the Turkish Grand Assembly 
appoint candidates from a greater variety of 
governmental and judicial entities. In order 
to ensure diversity of political backgrounds 
of the judges on the court, representative 
systems often require different branches 
of the government to appoint a set num-
ber of judicial appointees. For example, 
both Italy and Bosnia-Herzegovina call for 
representative systems in their respective 
constitutions, and have adopted systems 
promoting an ideologically diverse court. 
However, this diversity initiative can be 
undermined if appointment procedures are 
not transparent, as is the case in Bosnia-
Herzgovina, according to the European 
Center on Minority Issues.
Another amendment that may affect 
the diversity of the Constitutional Court 
is the one made to Article 146(b), replac-
ing a mandatory retirement age with a 
non-renewable twelve-year term for 
Constitutional Court appointees. The 
amended article reads, “The members of 
the Constitutional Court shall be elected 
for a term of twelve years. A member shall 
not be re-elected. The members of the 
Constitutional Court shall retire on reach-
ing the age of sixty-five.”
Fixed terms, like the ones used in the 
Constitutional Courts of Germany and 
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South Africa, are adopted in order to ensure 
that the Constitutional Court is composed 
of justices from a wide political spectrum. 
As justices with different political beliefs 
are cycled through these high courts every 
twelve years, the ideological composi-
tion of the Court will necessarily fluctu-
ate. Arguably, mandatory retirement ages, 
like the ones used in Russia’s Supreme 
Court, may stifle the jurisprudence in the 
Constitutional Court, because justices are 
not accountable to any entity and remain 
on the court for lengthy periods of time.
These amendments will undoubtedly 
shift the nature of the Constitutional Court. 
Turkey’s old Constitutional Court has 
been criticized for espousing traditional 
Kemalist views. It has staunchly defended 
laicism by denying women the right to 
wear hijabs in school and has granted the 
Turkish military leaders special privileges 
and immunities. From this perspective, 
change in judicial term limits is likely a 
positive step, because it may create room 
for the appointment of justices of differ-
ent political backgrounds. Still, while the 
amendment might allow the Constitutional 
Court to embrace more diverse ideological 
views over time, it may tie appointment of 
Supreme Court justices with the political 
agendas of new administrations.
Whether the administrative changes to 
the Constitutional Court will promote a 
more democratic judiciary is still uncer-
tain. However, if the reforms result in a 
more ideologically diverse and indepen-
dent judiciary, the Constitutional Court 
may be able to liberate the Turks from 
some of the worst features of Kemalism– 
the suppression of the freedom of religion 
and freedom of speech.
egypT’S parliamenTary eleCTionS— 
a Challenge To The emergenCy
On October 9, 2010 the Muslim 
Brotherhood, Egypt’s largest opposition 
party, announced that it would run in 
the parliamentary elections in November. 
Within two weeks, more than 200 mem-
bers of the Brotherhood were arrested. 
Egypt has been under a state of emergency 
for nearly 29 years, since Hosni Mubarak 
became president. Under Egypt’s state of 
emergency, security personnel are permit-
ted to arrest anyone suspected of posing a 
threat to the state, even if the actual threat 
is one of political opposition. Egypt’s use 
of the state of emergency to justify certain 
police actions is likely a violation of inter-
national law.
Egypt’s ruling party has used interna-
tional concern over terrorism as a basis on 
which to outlaw the Muslim Brotherhood 
for years. A state of emergency was first 
declared when Islamic groups targeted 
President Sadat in 1981, but the conditions 
that necessitated marital law have long 
disappeared. Counter-terrorism has taken 
on dimensions of such urgency within 
the international arena, that Egypt’s strict 
censorship on media and repression of 
opposition groups has gone long unchal-
lenged. However, the unprecedented levels 
of international attention to the upcom-
ing parliamentary elections in addition to 
heightened civil unrest makes one thing 
certain – Egypt’s state of emergency is at a 
crucial juncture.
The government has reasoned that it 
can arbitrarily arrest and detain politi-
cal opposition because of its emergency 
law. Emergency laws, such as Egypt’s 
State of Emergency statute, are not per se 
violative of international law. A state of 
emergency typically replaces rights and 
freedoms outlined in domestic legislation 
with more stringent laws. Article 4 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) permits a state to 
declare a temporary emergency when there 
is a public threat to the life of the nation. 
Even then, states can only take measures 
strictly required by the exigencies of the 
public emergency.
Egypt declared its state of emergency 
in response to alleged threats of terror 
which the administration identified as 
being a public threat. Terrorist threats can 
trigger emergency law. Security Council 
Resolution 1566 (2004) stipulates that an 
individual may only be considered a terror-
ist, if such an individual committed an act 
(1) against members of the general popula-
tion with the intention of causing death or 
serious bodily injury, (2) with the purpose 
of provoking a state of terror, intimidat-
ing a population, or to compel the State 
to abstain from doing any act, and (3) that 
can be defined as a serious crime under 
domestic law. The Human Rights Council 
subsequently adopted the same guidelines.
The circumstances in Egypt challenge 
the boundaries of a legal state of emer-
gency. The actions of Egyptian authorities 
likely violate the ICCPR and Resolution 
1566 by directly targeting representatives 
of the Muslim Brotherhood for voicing 
their political agenda. Article 3 of the 
State of Emergency law permits authori-
ties to arrest those suspected of disrupting 
public order without a warrant. It makes 
no mention of the criteria established in 
Resolution 1566. Of the 200 members of 
the Muslim Brotherhood recently arrested, 
not one is alleged to have committed an 
act that could be considered an act of ter-
rorism under the Resolution 1566. While 
the Brotherhood does have a controversial 
history, it officially renounced violence in 
1970s. With the exception of some isolated 
incidences, the Brotherhood largely func-
tions as a social welfare group in Egypt 
with a political undertone. However, some 
disgruntled pro-violence groups formed in 
response as a result of the Brotherhood’s 
decision to use peaceful means.
The government has reasoned that it 
can arbitrarily arrest political opposition 
because of the emergency law. The pro-
visions of the emergency law are vague 
and broadly applied by the Egyptian gov-
ernment. Most concerning is the length 
of the state of emergency. As Martin 
Scheinin, the UN Special Rapporteur on 
the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while 
Countering Terrorism, aptly asserted, “[a] 
state of emergency almost continuously in 
force for more than 50 years in Egypt is 
not a state of exceptionality; it has become 
the norm . . .”
Some consider the upcoming Egyptian 
elections as a litmus test, assessing the 
extent to which President Mubarak and 
his National Democratic Party will con-
tinue to exercise tight control over Egypt’s 
politics, and more importantly, over the 
2012 presidential elections. More than an 
Islamic group, the Muslim Brotherhood 
represents a widely supported political 
and socio-economic alternative to the cur-
rent administration. Under the declared 
state of emergency, all opposition groups 
stand little chance of posing a meaning-
ful opposition to the incumbent National 
Democratic Party. Conditions may change, 
however, as international and domestic 
pressure intensifies, compelling Mubarak 
to address challenges to his police state.
Shubra Ohri, a J.D. candidate at the Washington 
College of Law, covers the Middle East and 
North Africa for the Human Rights Brief.
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Sub-Saharan aFriCa
reCiproCal violenCe: maSS 
expulSionS beTWeen angola and  
The drC
In November 2010, the UN Children’s 
Fund (UNICEF) reported that more than 
650 women and girls had been raped during 
a mass expulsion of 6,621 undocumented 
Congolese immigrants from Angola to the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 
September and October 2010. The reports 
of sexual violence are based on evidence 
collected by NGO welcome committees in 
the Western Kasai province of the DRC. 
Many of the victims reported being locked 
up in derelict buildings, gang-raped, and 
tortured by Angolan security forces and 
then forced to walk several days back 
across the border into the DRC. Although 
the UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) confirmed 
the reports of sexual violence, neither it nor 
UNICEF has confirmed in which country 
the sexual violence took place.
To date, neither Angola nor the DRC 
has investigated the allegations. In response 
to press inquiries, the DRC information 
minister said that his government has not 
received any complaints and does not want 
“to launch a dossier.” Angola’s ambassador 
said that his government has been expelling 
undocumented Congolese immigrants, but 
asserted that DRC authorities are always 
notified about the expulsions. Despite 
the reports of sexual violence, Angolan 
authorities have not ceased the ongoing 
expulsions, with another 1,350 Congolese 
reportedly expelled in December 2010.
While the media has covered the recent 
reports of sexual violence, the ongoing 
cycle of forced expulsions of undocu-
mented immigrants from both Angola and 
the DRC has received scant international 
attention. Over the past decade, since the 
collapse of diamond mines in the southern 
DRC, an increasing number of Congolese 
citizens have crossed the border into 
Angola in search of better livelihoods and 
to escape ongoing violence and instability 
in the DRC. In response, the Angolan gov-
ernment forcibly expelled between 300,000 
and 400,000 Congolese citizens from its 
Lunda Norte region between 2003 and 
2009.
In 2004, the Angolan government began 
Operation Brillante, which sought to expel 
garimpeiros, undocumented foreign work-
ers in Angola’s informal diamond mining 
industry. The vast majority of garimpeiros 
are Congolese. Operation Brillante led 
to the expulsion of a recorded 80,000 
Congolese from Angola. In May 2009, 
the Angolan government began Operation 
Crisis, expelling 160,000 garimpeiros to 
the DRC. In response, the DRC forcibly 
expelled an estimated 51,000 Angolans, 
in what the media has termed a “tit-for-tat 
expulsion.” Many of the Angolans expelled 
were refugees from Angola’s 1975-2002 
civil war and had been living in the DRC 
for many years. In October 2009, Angola 
and the DRC agreed upon protocols to 
suspend expulsions and to conduct consul-
tations before any further deportations. But 
the most recent expulsions demonstrate 
Angola’s failure to comply with this agree-
ment.
Several humanitarian organizations, 
including Medecins Sans Frontieres 
(MSF), have documented a systematic pat-
tern of state-sponsored sexual abuse and 
torture by the Angolan armed forces dur-
ing these expulsions. MSF and OCHA also 
report that many returnees are forced to 
walk several days across the border and are 
suffering from dehydration, malnutrition, 
sleep deprivation, malaria, and HIV-related 
diseases upon their arrival in the DRC.
While the UN Humanitarian 
Coordinator for the DRC has developed 
an emergency response plan to address 
the needs of those recently expelled, previ-
ous experience indicates such institutional 
responses will have limited effect. Angola 
has consistently denied NGOs such as 
Human Rights Watch and UN organiza-
tions access to detention and deportation 
sites, and the International Organization 
for Migration has reportedly been unable 
to secure funding to assist those in need.
OCHA does not dispute the legality 
of Angola’s expulsions, but has called on 
both Angola and the DRC to ensure that 
any future deportations are carried out in 
an organized manner to prevent further 
humanitarian suffering. Both states have 
ratified the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, and the 
International Convention on Economic and 
Social and Cultural Rights. In addition 
to the rights of liberty and security of 
the person, freedom from arbitrary deten-
tion, and freedom from cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment enshrined in the 
international conventions, the actions of 
both Angola and the DRC violate Article 
12(4) and 12(5) of the African Charter. In 
1996, the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights ruled in a communica-
tion against Angola that these two provi-
sions, when read together, prohibit states 
from carrying out mass expulsions of non-
nationals based on nationality, race, ethnic-
ity, or religion without opportunity for a 
legal hearing. Accordingly, those expelled 
may well have recourse before the African 
Commission. But without increased inter-
national pressure and additional funding, 
it is unlikely that either the humanitarian 
or legal responses to recent expulsions 
will be an improvement on the ineffectual 
responses of the past.
meeTing The need For mediCal 
evidenCe in proSeCuTion oF Sexual 
violenCe: one key To Curbing 
impuniTy in Sub-Saharan aFriCa
Across the sub-Saharan region, stan-
dardized procedures for the collection of 
forensic evidence in crimes of sexual vio-
lence are severely lacking. This medico-
legal problem is one of the many obstacles 
to the effective prosecution of rape and 
sexual assault and contributes to the pan-
demic of sexual violence against women 
in the region. One of the reasons for this 
high prevalence of sexual violence is wide-
spread impunity for offenders. In countries 
such as Uganda and Zambia, marital rape 
– the most common form of sexual vio-
lence perpetrated against women – is not 
criminalized. Additionally, several coun-
tries allow an offender to escape prosecu-
tion if he proposes marriage to the victim. 
Even in those countries that do criminalize 
all forms of sexual violence, laws are often 
not enforced or contain loopholes. This 
systemic denial of justice to survivors and 
impunity for offenders normalizes rape and 
violence against women and girls.
In this context, proper guidelines and 
institutional capacity for the collection of 
medico-legal evidence become all the more 
important. Medico-legal evidence includes 
the collection of sperm, semen, and other 
forensic evidence and the documentation 
of physical injuries for use in court pro-
ceedings. While courts in the region may 
require the presentation of such evidence, 
sub-standard collection practices and lim-
ited numbers of medical professionals 
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often pose an insurmountable obstacle to 
survivors seeking justice.
Uganda’s current legal system frame-
work, for example, demonstrates a com-
plete disconnect between court eviden-
tiary requirements and the services actually 
available to survivors. Under Ugandan law, 
if a survivor of sexual violence decides 
to press charges against an assailant, she 
must first undergo a medical examination 
by a police surgeon. Uganda currently has 
only a handful of police surgeons — some 
reports suggest as few as two or three — all 
based in urban areas. In addition to prohib-
itively high transportation costs to urban 
areas, most survivors cannot afford police 
surgeon examination fees, which range 
between U.S. $15 and $25. Furthermore, 
sexual offenses can only be tried at the 
high court level, yet only five of Uganda’s 
112 districts currently have high courts. 
The Kampala-based Center for Women in 
Governance reports that 619 cases of rape 
were registered and investigated in Uganda 
in 2009. Of these, only 37 percent were 
prosecuted and only five percent resulted 
in criminal penalties for the perpetrators.
Some sub-Saharan states have taken 
small steps toward improving the med-
ico-legal services available to survivors. 
In October 2010, Zimbabwe’s Justice, 
Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Ministry 
announced that forensic evidence collected 
by State Registered Nurses (SRNs) will 
now be admissible as evidence in criminal 
court proceedings. Before the new policy, 
only medical doctors were authorized by 
law to collect forensic evidence, and, as 
in many other countries, victims of sexual 
violence often have to wait for days with-
out bathing before seeing a medical doctor. 
Zimbabwe’s new SRN policy thus fits into 
a larger state initiative to increase access 
to justice for survivors of sexual violence.
Another more comprehensive way of 
addressing the medico-legal problems 
faced by survivors of sexual violence 
employs the “one-stop” care center model 
developed in South Africa. Thuthuzela 
Care Centres (TCCs) are operated by South 
Africa’s National Prosecution Authority 
at public hospitals in communities where 
the incidence of rape and sexual violence 
is particularly high. TCCs provide a safe 
atmosphere where survivors receive imme-
diate treatment and counseling, referrals 
for long-term follow-up counseling, and 
subsequent transportation to a safe place. 
All medical examination procedures are 
explained by nurses and, with consent 
from the survivor, doctors conduct exami-
nations and collect forensic evidence. An 
investigating officer interviews survivors, 
and the center provides consultations with 
prosecutors, court preparation for victims, 
and explanations of court proceedings 
if a survivor presses charges. Through 
these centers, South Africa has distributed 
standardized medico-legal guidelines and 
developed forensic examiner programs for 
nurses.
Although South Africa still struggles 
with the deep cultural, societal, and eco-
nomic factors underlying its high rates 
of sexual violence against women, the 
TCC model represents an encouraging 
move toward more effective and acces-
sible resources for survivors. In 2007, 
the U.S. government created the Women’s 
Justice & Empowerment Initiative (WJEI) 
to expand the TCC model to Zambia, 
Benin, and Kenya. To date, WJEI has 
established coordinated response centers 
in seven districts in Zambia, a one-stop 
care center in Kenya’s largest hospital, 
and a pilot program in a Kenyan informal 
settlement. In Benin, WJEI has trained 
3,000 local volunteers in 35 communities 
to refer victims of sexual violence to NGO-
run services. These developments indicate 
a promising regional trend toward more 
effective medical and legal support for 
survivors of sexual violence. Nevertheless, 
the prevalence of sexual violence should 
not be underestimated. To combat it in ear-
nest, local and regional governments must 
prioritize capacity-building and technical 
training to facilitate prosecution and curb 
the culture of impunity for perpetrators.
Catherine Davies, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College of Law, 
covers Sub-Saharan Africa for the Human Rights 
Brief.
europe
Freedom To aSSemble in ruSSia: 
doeS The FuTure hold hope For 
improvemenT?
Recently, Russian policy has become 
increasingly strict on individuals’ rights 
to assemble and to protest, narrowing 
the state’s interpretation of these funda-
mental rights. Article 31 of the Russian 
Constitution and Article 11 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) pro-
tect individuals’ rights to peaceful assem-
bly. Nonetheless, the Russian government 
has restricted many non-violent protests 
causing an upheaval among demonstrators 
and activists.
Article 31 of the Russian Constitution 
establishes the right to assemble, stat-
ing: “Citizens of the Russian Federation 
shall have the right to gather peacefully, 
without weapons, and to hold meetings, 
rallies, demonstrations, marches and pick-
ets.” Additionally, Russia is a State Party 
to the ECHR, which also protects the right 
to peaceful assembly and to an effective 
remedy, and secures these rights without 
discrimination, under Articles 11, 13, and 
14, respectively. Under the ECHR, individ-
uals can remedy violations of these rights 
before the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR).
The most blatant restriction of the right 
to assemble is exemplified in Russia’s 
prohibition of the Moscow lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) 
pride parades from 2006 to 2008. Russian 
authorities feared that the demonstrations 
would cause violent reactions among the 
Russian people prejudiced against homo-
sexuals, and as such, the bans were alleg-
edly grounded in concern for public safety. 
The government’s ban on peaceful assem-
bly together with the discriminatory com-
ments of Moscow’s former mayor towards 
homosexuals caused parade organizers to 
bring claims of discrimination before the 
ECtHR.
Nikolay Alekseyev, founder and chief 
organizer of the LGBT rights group 
Moscow Pride, and a prominent LGBT 
rights activist, has filed three complaints 
with the ECtHR in response to Russia’s ban 
on the LGBT demonstrations and the lack 
of an available remedy under Russian law 
to challenge these bans. The complaints 
allege that Russia violated Articles 11, 13, 
and 14 of the ECHR. On October 21, the 
ECtHR, in Alekseyev v. Russia, ruled in 
favor of Alekseyev, marking the first vic-
tory for LGBT rights activists in a case 
against Russia before the ECtHR. The 
ECtHR reasoned that Moscow authorities’ 
concern over possible disturbances caused 
by the demonstrations was insufficient to 
justify the ban. This ruling reinforces the 
LGBT community’s right to protest and 
organize, and extends protection of the 
right to peaceful assembly to other groups.
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The ECtHR further found that the peti-
tioners were denied an effective domestic 
remedy to address the breach of freedom of 
assembly because the LGBT community’s 
claims were not given a fair hearing in 
Russia, despite the constitutional guarantee 
to peaceful assembly. The ECtHR stated 
that conditioning a minority group’s rights 
to freedom of assembly on the majority of 
the population’s acceptance of these rights 
is inconsistent with the values of Article 14 
of the Convention. As a result, the ECtHR 
imposed a fine of €29,510 in damages and 
legal fees to be paid to Alekseyev.
In a movement to combat the oppres-
sive policies of the Russian government, 
a group known as Strategy 31, whose 
name refers to Section 31 of the Russian 
Constitution, is working to bring atten-
tion to the restrictions on freedom of 
expression and right to assemble by orga-
nizing monthly protests and distributing 
pamphlets. The members of the Section 
31 movement hold protests in Moscow’s 
Triumfalnaya Square each month with 31 
days in order to draw attention to Article 
31 of the Russian Constitution. Beginning 
in 2009, Strategy 31 has been working to 
restore the right of the Russian people to 
assemble, and, until September 2010, the 
government banned all nine protests spon-
sored by Strategy 31 for various reasons. 
Despite the government’s opposition, the 
demonstrations have gained support from 
many of Russia’s wide range of human 
rights groups affected by the government’s 
restrictive policies. In October, Moscow 
also prohibited protests for political reform 
and demonstrations against the destruction 
of 1,000 hectares of the Khimki forest.
Perhaps as a result of publicity from the 
Aleksevev case or the constant pressure by 
Strategy 31, the Russian government has 
taken affirmative steps toward improving 
individuals’ right to assemble. Russian 
President Dmitry Medvedev overturned 
the federal “Law on Rallies, Meetings, 
Demonstrations, Marches, and Pickets” 
sponsored by the United Russian Party. The 
law would have made organizing future 
demonstrations a crime for individuals pre-
viously convicted of planning illegal rallies. 
Additionally, the Russian government per-
mitted Strategy 31’s October 2010 monthly 
protest. Finally, authorities have allowed 
several rallies commemorating journal-
ists who were murdered for investigating 
and exposing human rights violations and 
violators, including Kremlin critic Anna 
Politkovskaya and Oleg Kashin. Various 
Russian activists are hopeful that the suc-
cess in Alekseyev’s case is a step forward 
for greater recognition of the freedom to 
assemble and protest.
SpaniSh auThoriTieS exTradiTe 
moroCCan man deSpiTe riSk oF 
TorTure
On November 19, 2010, the Spanish 
Council of Ministers approved the extra-
dition of Ali Aarrass to Morocco, ignor-
ing concerns that Aarrass may face tor-
ture upon return. The extradition was 
ordered against UN recommendations to 
refrain from removing Aarrass until the 
Committee on Human Rights reviewed 
his case. Because substantial grounds for 
believing that Aarrass may be tortured 
exist, the extradition violates Article 3(1) 
of the UN Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment.
Spain is a party to and has ratified 
many international treaties that expressly 
prohibit a person’s extradition to a coun-
try where they would be at risk of tor-
ture, including Article 5 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 
Article 3 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR), Article 7 
of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
UN Convention against Torture. Spanish 
authorities held Aarrass on terrorism-
related charges as a suspect in the May 
2003 suicide bomb attacks in Casablanca, 
Morocco. He holds dual Belgian-Moroccan 
citizenship and has been under investiga-
tion by the Spanish National Criminal 
Court (Audiencia Nacional) since May 
2006. Aarrass was arrested in the Spanish 
city of Melilla on April 1, 2008 on a war-
rant issued by Morocco one month ear-
lier. The Spanish National Criminal Court 
reviewed Aarrass’s case, and on March 16, 
2009, official investigations were provi-
sionally closed by Judge Baltasar Garzon 
for lack of evidence. However, Aarrass 
remained detained in Spain pursuant to 
an extradition request from the Moroccan 
government.
On November 21, 2008, the Spanish 
National Criminal Court authorized 
Aarrass’s extradition to Morocco based 
on Morocco’s pledge that Aarrass would 
not face the death penalty or a life sen-
tence without the possibility of parole. 
The court rejected Aarrass’s argument that 
his joint Belgian-Moroccan citizenship 
should bar his extradition to Morocco. The 
court based its decision on a 1997 treaty 
between Belgium and Morocco that allows 
for dual Belgian-Moroccan nationals who 
have committed a crime which carries a 
sentence of two or more years to be extra-
dited to Morocco from anywhere in the 
European Union. According to Amnesty 
International, Aarrass appealed his case to 
the Constitutional Court of Spain claiming 
that his extradition would violate the prin-
ciple of double jeopardy. Because Spain 
found insufficient evidence upon which 
to charge Aarrass, his extradition would 
amount to receiving two separate judg-
ments for the same offense.
Aarrass’s appeal does not suspend the 
extradition process. On November 26, 
2010, the UN Human Rights Committee 
issued a provisional measure calling on 
Spain to refrain from enforcing the extra-
dition until the Committee had time to 
decide the case. Despite the UN’s pro-
visional measure, the Spanish Council 
of Ministers approved Aarrass’s extradi-
tion on November 19, 2010, based on 
Morocco’s pledge that Aarrass would not 
face the death penalty or a life sentence 
without the possibility of parole. Aarrass 
was removed from Spain to Morocco on 
December 15, 2010.
The international outcry over Aarrass’s 
extradition arises from fear for violations 
against terrorist suspects in Moroccan 
prisons. International organizations, 
including Human Rights Watch, Amnesty 
International, and the Arab Commission 
for Human Rights recognize human rights 
violations committed by Moroccan secu-
rity officials against suspects arrested 
under the country’s counterterrorism law. 
Pursuant to this law, Moroccan suspects are 
often detained without explanation and are 
subjected to torture. Human Rights Watch 
reports indicate that Moroccan detainees 
are often beaten, suspended in contorted 
positions, threatened with the sexual abuse 
of the detainee’s female relatives, sleep 
deprived, or subjected to cigarette burns.
Spain’s decision to extradite Aarrass 
violates multiple international treaties to 
which Spain is a party. The ruling of Spain’s 
National Criminal Court to continue with 
the extradition despite the known risks and 
warnings by the UN and violations of inter-
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national human rights treaties could lead to 
claims against Spain before the European 
Court of Human Rights and the Human 
Rights Council.
Molly Hofsommer, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College of Law, 
covers Europe for the Human Rights Brief.
SouTh and CenTral aSia
made in kazakhSTan: migranT 
Child labor in kazakhSTan’S 
TobaCCo FieldS
Despite national and international 
laws prohibiting children from working 
in tobacco fields, many migrant youth in 
Kazakhstan reportedly spend up to thirteen 
hours per day harvesting Philip Morris 
Kazakhstan’s (PMK) tobacco leaves dur-
ing the hottest months of the year. Most 
of the children have migrated with their 
families from other Central Asian coun-
tries to work in the fields. The intense 
labor requirements, and exposure to toxic 
pesticides and dangerous levels of nico-
tine, jeopardize the safety and health of 
field workers, especially child laborers, 
who are more vulnerable than adults to the 
hazards of tobacco farming. PMK has dis-
regarded its corporate social responsibility 
by profiting from migrant child labor in 
Kazakhstan, and the Kazakh Government 
has been complicit in gross violations of 
international and domestic laws protecting 
the rights of migrant children by allowing 
these practices to continue.
Kazakhstan has ratified several inter-
national treaties, which prohibit migrant 
child labor. Article 10 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), which Kazakhstan 
ratified in 2006, prohibits the economic 
and social exploitation of children. The 
ICESCR restricts children from working 
in environments that are harmful to their 
health or development, such as PMK’s 
tobacco fields. Frequently handling large 
amounts of tobacco can lead to a condition 
called “green tobacco sickness,” which is 
caused by the absorption of large amounts 
of nicotine into the skin and can cause 
vomiting and headaches.
Furthermore, the ICESCR urges 
states to establish minimum age limits 
for child workers. Kazakh law itself pro-
hibits those younger than eighteen from 
working on tobacco farms. Nevertheless, 
the Kazakhstan Government reported 
more than 900 incidents of migrant child 
labor in 2009 and more than 1,200 in 
2008. Kazakhstan is also bound under the 
ICESCR to uphold rights for all, regard-
less of national origin. The fact that many 
of the child laborers are migrants from 
other Central Asian countries should make 
no difference in how the government 
addresses this issue.
Additionally, the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, to which Kazakhstan 
is a party, requires member states to pro-
tect children, regardless of nationality, 
from work that interferes with their health. 
Article 32 of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child further calls on member states 
to provide a minimum employment age; 
regulate hours and conditions; and establish 
penalties and-or sanctions to ensure that 
employers adhere to the law. As a member 
of the United Nations International Labor 
Organization, Kazakhstan is also bound by 
the Minimum Age Convention and Worst 
Forms of Child Labor Convention, the lat-
ter of which seeks to protect children from 
forced labor and harmful professions.
Even though Kazakhstan has not signed 
or ratified the International Convention 
on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families, which seeks to protect immi-
grants from less favorable work conditions 
and increases the recognition of migrant 
workers’ rights, the previously mentioned 
international treaties and domestic laws 
prohibit Kazakhstan from allowing migrant 
child labor in tobacco fields. However, 
Kazakhstan’s refusal to join itself to this 
Convention sends a mixed message to the 
international community.
PMK, a wholly owned subsidiary of one 
of the world’s largest tobacco companies 
Philip Morris International (PMI), buys 
all of the tobacco in the Enbekshikazakh 
district of Almaty province, where nearly 
all of Kazakshtan’s tobacco is grown. 
PMI has claimed that in past efforts to 
eliminate migrant child labor practices, it 
required Kazakh farmers to sign contracts 
with assurances of adequate labor condi-
tions. However, in 2009, despite more 
than twenty reports of migrant child labor 
to PMK, PMK only terminated a single 
farm’s contract for repeat offenses. Since 
the report’s release in 2010, PMI has 
promised to improve communications with 
PMK and work with the local government.
Despite its international and national 
legal commitment to ban migrant child 
labor, Kazakhstan sustains a culture where 
children work days, nights, and weekends 
in tobacco fields. To show the world that it 
is attuned to the rights of migrant families, 
the Kazakh Government could ratify the 
International Convention on the Protection 
of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families, in addition to 
meeting its current international legal obli-
gations. PMK should terminate contracts 
with farms that repeatedly use child labor 
and the government should initiate more 
inspections of fields and impose sanctions 
for violations. Much more needs to be done 
by the Kazakh Government and business 
community to eradicate migrant child labor 
from Kazakhstan’s tobacco fields.
hoW india’S ConServaTion eFForTS 
impaCT indigenouS peopleS
India has seventy million hectares of 
forests, which is more than twice the entire 
geographical area of Finland. Besides the 
diverse array of animals and vegetation 
that call the Indian forests home, 250 mil-
lion people depend upon the forests for 
their livelihoods. Many of these people are 
members of native tribes whose rights are 
protected under international and national 
laws. While India’s sizeable indigenous 
forest-dwelling population is receiving the 
benefit of the country’s environmental con-
servation efforts, more targeted efforts 
could be undertaken to fulfill the nation’s 
international promises toward indigenous 
peoples. Efforts to increase the quality and 
quantity of ten million hectares of forest 
include the Indian government’s creation 
of the Green India Mission and the Forest 
Rights Act (FRA). These policies have 
been commended for their progressive 
goals in environmental conservation and 
promotion of indigenous peoples’ rights, 
but have also faced some criticism for 
weak implementation.
In 2008, India’s National Action Plan 
on Climate Change (NAPCC) established 
the Green India Mission to increase forest 
coverage in order to decrease carbon lev-
els, develop ecosystems, and protect for-
est-dependent communities. In December 
2010 at the United Nations (UN) Climate 
Change Conference in Cancún, Mexico, 
India’s Minister of Environment and 
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Forests Jairam Ramesh affirmed his coun-
try’s commitment to conservation. He said,
We are pursuing aggressive strate-
gies on forestry and coastal man-
agement. . . . India . . . [will] 
be amongst the most responsi-
ble in ensuring a high rate of 
growth of the real GDP — Green 
Domestic Product. That is my 
solemn assurance to the world 
community today on behalf of the 
Government of India.
By setting ambitious conservation 
goals, India is also meeting its interna-
tional commitments to indigenous “for-
est dwellers.” India supported the non-
binding UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (Declaration), which 
aims to acknowledge and protect indig-
enous land rights. The Declaration forbids 
forcibly displacing indigenous peoples and 
upholds their right to possess and use their 
land.
Despite India’s lack of international 
legal obligations towards indigenous peo-
ple, the Green India Mission does recog-
nize and include language in support of 
forest dwellers’ rights. Besides the pro-
tection of individual rights, the mission 
seeks to provide community forest rights 
over resource allocation, according to the 
Ministry of Environment and Forests’ mis-
sion plan.
India’s direct endorsement of the 
Declaration was an extension of prior 
domestic commitments. In 2006, the Indian 
Parliament passed the FRA, which recog-
nizes, vests, and establishes a framework of 
forest dwellers’ rights. The key aspects of 
the FRA include private or communal land 
ownership rights or restitution and commu-
nity rights, including resource allocation.
The implementation of FRA, which 
went into effect two years ago, has received 
a fair dose of criticism. In April 2010, the 
Ministry of Environment and Forests and 
the Ministry of Tribal Affairs created a 
joint committee to review the FRA. After 
visiting seventeen states, the committee 
issued a lengthy report that generally found 
weak implementation, namely that tribal 
livelihood security had not been achieved. 
Specifically, the committee discovered 
problems with large-scale mapping efforts 
and the documentation process, including 
issuing land title deeds.
Because India’s forests contain valu-
able minerals like iron ore and bauxite, 
mining corporations – many of which 
are aligned with the government – are 
eager to develop these areas. Nevertheless, 
civil society has praised the Environmental 
Ministry for carefully vetting development 
proposals. In August 2010, the British firm 
Vedanta Resources PLC proposed a $1.7 
billion project with the East Indian state of 
Orissa to mine bauxite. The Environmental 
Ministry rejected it based on the potential 
harm to the ecosystem and the five thou-
sand primitive tribal members who live in 
the region. Vedanta has previously been 
sued for mining projects that have inter-
fered with the rights of tribes in Orissa. In 
2008, Survival International, a tribal rights 
organization, sued Vedanta for damage 
related to aluminum manufacturing and 
planned bauxite mining.
India could further show its support 
for indigenous peoples by ratifying the 
International Labor Organization’s (ILO) 
Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples. However, while the convention 
deals directly with the rights of native peo-
ples and becomes legally binding one year 
after ratification, there have been problems 
with implementation in other countries.
India’s lofty conservation goals have 
had a positive ripple effect on the nation’s 
indigenous groups. The FRA and Green 
India Mission have been commended for 
considering forest dwellers’ rights, but 
not without some criticism for imper-
fect implementation. As its environmental 
efforts progress, the nation should improve 
upon past mistakes under the FRA and 
continue to properly vet development pro-
posals in the region.
Misty Seemans, a J.D. candidate at the American 
University Washington College of Law covers the 
South and Central Asia for the Human Rights 
Brief.
SouTheaST aSia and oCeana
Cambodia’S human righTS progreSS 
and naTional reConCiliaTory 
eFForTS in jeopardy
In July 2010, the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
(ECCC) issued its first verdict, finding 
Kaing Guek Eav “Duch,” a Khmer Rouge 
official, guilty of crimes against human-
ity and war crimes for his operation of 
the Toul Sleng detention center in Phnom 
Penh. A second trial for four of the most 
senior surviving Khmer Rouge leaders is 
scheduled to begin in 2011, but Cambodian 
Prime Minister Hun Sen has publicly said 
that the trials will end there. Additionally, 
on October 26, 2010, the Government of 
Cambodia called for the removal of the 
UN Human Rights Commission’s presence 
from Cambodia. Foreign Minister Hor Nam 
Hong explained that the removal would be 
justified because the UNHRC office has 
acted as “a spokesperson for the opposi-
tion party,” and because the UN human 
rights envoy, Christophe Peschoux “[did] 
not work . . . on human rights issues with 
the government.” Politicizing the UNHRC 
might be an attempt to delegitimize the 
office in the eyes of the public before the 
government officially ends trials for crimes 
committed under the Khmer Rouge.
The ECCC was created originally by 
an agreement with the UN and was for-
mally established in 2006, with financial 
help from foreign governments and inter-
national bodies, such as the European 
Union. Generally, the ECCC’s jurisdic-
tion extends over crimes committed by 
members of the senior leadership in the 
Khmer Rouge regime. Article 8 of the 
Law on the Establishment of ECCC for the 
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During 
the Period of Democratic Kampuchea 
(Khmer Rouge) provides that the ECCC 
has the power to try those “who were 
most responsible for the crimes and seri-
ous violations of Cambodian penal law, 
international humanitarian law and custom, 
and international conventions recognized 
by Cambodia, that were committed during 
the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 
1979,” at the height of the Khmer Rouge 
regime.
Up to three million people perished 
during the Khmer Rouge regime. Thus, 
limiting the ECCC trials for war crimes 
and crimes against humanity to only five 
potentially means that the Cambodian 
government would bring no future case 
against other senior leaders also involved 
in planning the killings. Also problematic 
is that, apart from the ECCC, Cambodia 
effectively lacks another venue in which to 
try surviving Khmer Rouge officials, and 
it refuses to allow other nations or interna-
tional venues try the officials. Therefore, 
the ECCC represents the best chance for 
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justice; however, its politicization will lead 
to support for its discontinuance, which 
would effectively grant impunity to all 
other Khmer Rouge officers who were on 
the ground carrying out the brutal crimes 
against humanity dictated by the regime’s 
leadership. Even if Cambodia were to 
remove the trials to its Supreme Court or 
Military Court, the government openly 
acknowledges the weaknesses of its overall 
legal system. Its national courts fall short 
of international standards, the primary 
reason the ECCC was created, such as 
being independent, fair, and of sufficient 
resources to try the Khmer Rouge cases. 
The argument could be made, however, 
that any trial is better than no trial; after all, 
the Cambodian populace has been waiting 
for justice for over thirty years.
The possible closure of the UNHRC 
office in Cambodia will make the prosecu-
tion of crimes committed during the Khmer 
Rouge regime, in addition to the two cases 
at the ECCC, unlikely. Human rights groups 
such as Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch argue that the possible clo-
sure of the UNHRC’s office constitutes a 
“direct assault on the UN’s human rights 
mandate, encompassed by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the inter-
national human rights conventions.” As 
a state party to the ICCPR and ICESCR, 
Cambodia is obligated to respect rights 
protected by those instruments, as well as 
the UN mandate in general. However, Hun 
Sen’s plan to “dig a hole and bury the past,” 
by capping the trials for Khmer Rouge 
officials, limits justice and secures his own 
immunity from additional trials. As some 
analysts have asserted, any extension of 
trials into the lower ranks of the Khmer 
Rouge could uncover evidence implicat-
ing Hun Sen and other former officers 
of the Khmer Rouge, many who are Hun 
Sen’s political allies. Such evidence could 
undermine Hun Sen’s political position and 
his majority party’s continued leadership.
By closing the UNHCR office, and 
effectively disengaging with the inter-
national community on human rights, 
Cambodia is taking two steps backwards. 
In doing so, the government could seri-
ously jeopardize all the progress achieved 
by the ECCC, which could have long-
term detrimental effects on the ability of 
the Cambodian society to reconcile and 
improve human rights.
enSuring religiouS Freedom in 
indoneSia: hoW The governmenT iS 
Failing To meeT iTS inTernaTional  
and ConSTiTuTional obligaTionS
The freedom to practice one’s religion 
without unlawful interference or coercion 
is increasingly under threat for religious 
minorities in Indonesia. Christian denomi-
nations, specifically, seem to be the target 
of extremist hostilities. On December 17, 
2010, the eve of the Islamic New Year, a 
crowd set fire to a Catholic church under 
construction in Bekasi, West Java,. Five 
days earlier, 200 demonstrators from hard-
line Islamic organizations, including the 
Indonesian Ulama Forum, together with 
the Civil Service Police Unit of Rancaekek, 
raided seven churches. The demonstrators 
disrupted worship services and, ultimately, 
forcibly closed the churches, expelling 
hundreds of worshipers into the streets. 
The government has often failed to extend 
state protection to non-registered places of 
worship outside of this Christian holiday 
season. Most recently, on February 8, 2011, 
more than 1,000 extremist Muslim demon-
strators raided a courthouse and burned 
two churches in Temanggung, located in 
central Java, after a Christian man was sen-
tenced to five years in prison for distribut-
ing leaflets deemed blasphemous to Islam. 
Although Indonesia’s Constitution and its 
international obligations require it to rec-
ognize and maintain the right to freedom 
of religion in Indonesia, that right, espe-
cially for religious minorities, has largely 
been left to the worshippers themselves 
to defend. Consequently, the minorities’ 
human right to freely worship is at risk of 
being de facto annulled.
As a State Party to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), Indonesia must abide by Article 
18, which protects the rights to “freedom 
of thought, conscience, and religion,” and 
includes the right to “manifest [one’s] 
religion or belief in worship, observance, 
practice, and teaching.” Chapter XI, Article 
29(2) of the Indonesian Constitution pro-
tects the same principle right: “The state 
guarantees each and every citizen the 
freedom of religion and of worship in 
accordance with his religion and belief.” 
However, in Indonesia, the organized prac-
tice of religion in groups may only be 
carried out in places of worship that are 
registered with the government. To register, 
religious groups must solicit and procure 
a Joint Ministerial Decree (SKB), which 
is approved and issued jointly through the 
Religious Affairs Ministry and the Home 
Ministry, provided that the religious lead-
ers or planners have first met a list of strin-
gent requirements. Among them are the 
obtainment of local consent as manifested 
by the signatures of sixty local residents at 
minimum, proof of at least ninety church 
members, and approval from village lead-
ers and a local interfaith forum.
Minority religious groups have com-
plained that the SKB process is discrimi-
natory and infringes on their constitu-
tional rights. As a result, many churches 
are unregistered and located in house-like 
dwellings, or “house churches,” making 
them vulnerable to attack by extremist 
groups. An International Crisis Group 
(ICG) report on religion in Indonesia, 
called “Indonesia: Christianisation and 
Intolerance,” dates the start of a state of 
elevated religious tensions in Bekasi, a 
prominent suburb of Jakarta, back to 2008. 
The report attributed the rise in tensions to 
competition between “hard line Islamists 
and Christian evangelicals . . . for the 
same ground,” including mass conversion 
efforts, church construction, and “affronts 
to Islam.” Furthermore, ICG cites govern-
ment reluctance to prosecute “hate speech” 
due to unclear legal limits of free speech, 
and it suggests that Indonesia develop a 
strategy to address the growing religious 
intolerance “because without one, mob 
rule prevails.”
In a move demonstrative of the gov-
ernment’s stance, Jakarta’s Police Chief 
issued a statement on December 18, 2010 
vowing to provide protection for every 
registered church from attack during the 
Christian holiday season. Thus far, the gov-
ernment has failed to sufficiently thwart 
the extremist groups who are moving freely 
in Indonesia and raiding house churches 
– exercising their own type of vigilante 
justice. Although Article 29 of Indonesia’s 
Constitution cannot realistically be inter-
preted to require that the government pro-
tect individuals from every private threat 
to their freedom of religion, failing to 
sufficiently address this pervasive type of 
“unchecked extremism” threatens minor-
ity groups’ rights to freely worship, as 
it implies that the government condones 
these aggressive hostilities.
Indonesia is legally obligated to rec-
ognize and protect the right to practice 
any religion freely and manifestly, and 
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as such, it must take prompt, affirmative 
actions to stop the church raids by hold-
ing accountable the extremist groups who 
conduct them and simultaneously foster-
ing a national culture of acceptance. The 
government must also lower the barrier to 
receive an SKB because, in practice, the 
stringent requirements make it difficult 
for minority groups to obtain government 
approval. Thus, the unregistered churches 
go undocumented in government records 
and are more vulnerable to attack because 
they lack the full rights of other organized 
religious bodies under the law. Therefore, 
the Indonesian government needs to take 
a more active role in protecting minori-
ties’ right to freedom of religion in order 
to satisfy its international and domestic 
obligations as well as strengthen the unity 
of a growingly diverse nation.
Leah Chavla, a J.D. candidate at the American 
University Washington College of Law, cov-
ers Southeast Asia and Oceana for the Human 
Rights Brief.
eaST aSia
SouTh korea’S naTional SeCuriTy 
laW: legiTimaTe meaSure or 
ThreaT To Freedom oF SpeeCh?
On January 10, 2011, South Korean 
officials accused a 54-year old man known 
only as “Cho” of using various websites, 
including Twitter, to praise the North 
Korean government and distribute infor-
mation from its official website. The South 
Korean government indicted Cho under the 
country’s National Security Law (NSL), 
which prohibits positive remarks about 
and dissemination of material by anti-state 
groups. The law has been criticized for 
failing to clearly define which activities it 
prohibits, and human rights groups claim 
that it may be applied in cases where 
national security is not actually at risk, 
ultimately violating the right to freedom 
of expression guaranteed under Article 21 
of the Korean Constitution and Article 19 
of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), which South 
Korea ratified in 1990. While Korean 
courts have ruled that the NSL is only 
applicable in cases where national security 
is actually threatened, the courts have used 
inconsistent standards to determine what 
constitutes such a threat.
The NSL was passed in 1948 shortly 
after the establishment of South Korea. 
It defines anti-state groups as “domestic 
or foreign organizations or groups whose 
intentions are to conduct or assist infiltra-
tion of the Government or to cause national 
disturbances.” As recently as 2010, the 
Supreme Court affirmed that this defini-
tion was intended to include North Korea 
and pro-North Korean organizations. 
While the South Korean government main-
tains that the NSL is a necessary and legiti-
mate national security measure, human 
rights organizations such as Amnesty 
International have documented numerous 
cases since the law’s inception in which 
its application served only to stifle legiti-
mate freedom of expression and speech. 
For example, in the 1990s the government 
used the law to punish a Korean filmmaker 
for showing his film about the suppression 
of communists in the 1940s. According 
to Amnesty International, “while certain 
left-wing political works are permitted for 
academic study, possession or reference to 
the same works often becomes a criminal 
offense in the hands of a student or activist 
with perceived ‘pro North Korea’ lean-
ings.” This inconsistent pattern of enforce-
ment indicates that the information itself is 
likely not a risk to national security.
South Korean courts have ruled in the 
past that supposed violators of the NSL 
who do not pose a threat to national 
security cannot be found guilty of violat-
ing the law. The courts have nevertheless 
been inconsistent in the standard used to 
determine whether pro-North Korean state-
ments or information dissemination poses 
a risk to national security. Just two months 
prior to Cho’s indictment, the Supreme 
Court found another South Korean resident 
known as “Song” guilty of violating the 
NSL for mere possession of instrumental 
songs with pro North Korean titles. In 
2010, the Supreme Court held that a stu-
dent involved in pro North Korean student 
groups who possessed information prais-
ing North Korea and who demonstrated in 
support of North Korea while obstructing 
traffic was guilty of violating the NSL. 
Even though four of thirteen justices dis-
sented, citing a dangerously low standard 
for determining whether an activity pres-
ents a risk great enough to justify the 
restriction, the majority noted that, since 
the defendant’s motives were not “aca-
demic research and profit,” he must have 
“possessed it with a purpose to praise, 
encourage the activities of [the] anti-state 
organization.” While the Supreme Court 
has consistently applied this lower thresh-
old for a risk to national security, other 
South Korean courts have applied higher 
standards. For example, in a 2008 public 
statement calling for the repeal or reform 
of the NSL, Amnesty International cited 
the case of professor Oh Se-chul, who had 
warrants for his arrest issued twice because 
of his involvement in the Socialist Labour 
Solidarity movement. In both instances, 
the Seoul Central District Court found a 
lack of “proof that he tried to overthrow 
the country and the democratic system,” 
indicating a much higher standard for what 
constitutes a threat to national security 
under the NSL.
Such inconsistency in the standards 
used by South Korean courts to determine 
whether a national security risk exists in 
NSL cases reflects a struggle in South 
Korea over how to balance the coun-
try’s democratic ideals with its national 
security concerns. Although inconsistently 
applied in South Korean courts, the cur-
rent standard set by the Supreme Court for 
determining what expression qualifies as 
a threat to national security appears low 
enough that the freedom of expression 
protected by Article 19 of the ICCPR is 
threatened. The case of Cho offers another 
opportunity for the South Korean judicial 
system to interpret the NSL in a manner 
consistent with international legal norms.
China’S iud poliCy: groundS For 
reFugee STaTuS?
On February 1, 2011, the U.S. Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals heard the case of 
Mei Fun Wong, a Chinese national seeking 
asylum in the United States. Wong seeks 
asylum on the basis that she allegedly faces 
persecution in China because she refuses 
to comply with China’s policy requiring 
women to use intrauterine devices (IUD) 
under the country’s population control 
policy. China allows for the involuntary 
insertion of IUDs when women fail to vol-
untarily comply with the policy. The Court 
denied a portion of Wong’s petition in 
accordance with a 2010 decision that invol-
untary insertion of an IUD, absent “aggra-
vating circumstances,” is not “involuntary 
sterilization” for the purposes of determin-
ing refugee status under the Immigration 
and Nationality Act. Nevertheless, the 
Court remanded the decision to the Board 
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) for it to 
“articulate the aggravating circumstances 
and nexus standards it applied to the case 
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. . . to permit judicial review.” While the 
United States is not a signatory to the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, its accession to the 1967 Protocol 
indicates its commitment to implementing 
the Convention. Accordingly, Wong’s case 
raises compelling questions as to whether 
the involuntary insertion of IUDs should 
be considered persecution for the purposes 
of determining refugee status under inter-
national standards.
In 1991, after the birth of her son, Wong 
was forced by Chinese officials to wear an 
IUD to prevent future pregnancy. Wong’s 
requests to have the IUD removed due to 
severe pain were denied, and in 1992, she 
arranged for a private doctor to remove 
the IUD. When an annual gynecological 
examination revealed that the IUD was 
gone, Wong was detained for three days. 
She was released from detention once she 
acquiesced to the insertion of a new IUD. 
In 1998, Wong attempted to flee China to 
avoid what she called the “continual torture 
and torment” of wearing the IUD, but was 
stopped in Hong Kong and jailed for four 
months. Upon return to the mainland, the 
government fined her for leaving China 
illegally and for missing required gyne-
cological appointments. In 2000, she and 
her son arrived in the United States and 
sought asylum, citing fear of future perse-
cution based on her past persecution under 
China’s population control policy.
In its Note on Refugee Claims Based on 
Coercive Family Planning Laws or Policies 
(UNHCR Note), the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
recognizes the necessity of non-discrim-
inatory and non-coercive family plan-
ning policies aimed at improving general 
welfare, but maintains that such policies 
should be consistent with international 
human rights standards. Under the Refugee 
Convention, an individual is eligible for 
refugee status if, “owing to a well-founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of 
a particular social group or political opin-
ion” she is unable or unwilling to return 
to her country. According to the UNHCR, 
claims for refugee status resulting from 
coercive family planning policies violating 
international human rights standards may 
be justified based on a fear of persecution 
due to the impact or harm suffered because 
of the policy or due to the penalties or 
sanctions imposed for non-compliance.
While the UNHCR considers some 
family planning policies such as forced 
abortion or forced sterilization to be inher-
ently persecutory, it is unclear whether 
involuntary insertion of IUDs is persecu-
tory under the Convention. Claims for ref-
ugee status based solely on China’s policy 
of forced IUD insertion are often distin-
guished from those based on forced steril-
ization or abortion because of the tempo-
rary and seemingly noninvasive nature of 
IUDs. Nevertheless, a claim based on the 
IUD policy that succeeded in demonstrat-
ing a well-founded fear of persecution 
based on a political opinion – such as the 
desire not to wear an IUD – would likely 
be sufficient to qualify for refugee status. 
Additionally, individuals such as Wong 
who have been imprisoned or potentially 
face imprisonment for violating the IUD 
policy have stronger claims for refugee sta-
tus, according to the UNHCR Note, even if 
the imprisonment is brief.
In Wong’s case, her claims that the IUD 
is painful, her repeated attempts to breach 
the policy by having the IUD removed, and 
her decision to leave the country, make 
clear her political opinion that she should 
not have to wear the device. Together with 
her prior imprisonment for failure to com-
ply with the policy, these facts should be 
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of ref-
ugee status based on international norms. 
Wong’s future ultimately rests on the BIA’s 
decision on remand, which the Second 
Circuit instructed to look to international 
standards. It is unclear what will happen 
to Wong in China after such disregard for 
the population control policy if her second 
attempt before the BIA fails.
Kaitlin Brush, a J.D. candidate at the Washington 
College of Law, covers the East Asia for the 
Human Rights Brief. HRB
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